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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1960
The court held that when defendant took possession, with plaintiff's
consent, without any lease for a definite term, he became a tenant at will.
He could not be charged rent until this tenancy was terminated because
no rent was contemplated until the permit could be issued. It was fur-
ther held that once plaintiff gave notice to defendant to charge him rent,
to which defendant did not object at that time, the occupancy would be
under plaintiff's terms. Therefore, the defendant was liable for rent
from the time of the demand until he vacated the basement. However,
the demand could not be applied retroactively to charge defendant rent
for the period he occupied the premises preceding the demand.
An interesting case of first impression is Union Commerce Bank v.
Kimbro,4 decided by the Cleveland Municipal Court. The lease, executed
by defendant, contained a waiver of "all right to trial by jury in any
summary proceeding... against the Lessee in respect to the demised
premises."5 The court held, relying incidentally on case law from other
jurisdictions, that such a clause was not against public policy and was a
reasonable provision for the lessor to ask as a condition of the tenancy.
This means that when a lease contains such a waiver, a lessee cannot stall
a forcible entry and detainer action, possibly for months, by demanding
a jury trial. The insertion of such a clause in a lease may save a lessor
substantial amounts of time and money by insuring the use of a summary
proceeding in forcible entry and detainer.




In Cupps v. City of Toledo' the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a state
statute over the provisions. of Toledo's municipal charter, but the victory
was one to have been expected and hardly any real blow to home rule.
A provision of Toledo's charter stated that upon disciplinary proceed-
ings against any person in the classified service of that city, the employee
should have an appeal to the civil service commission, and that "the com-
mission's judgment in the matter shall be final." This is in dear and
1. 164 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
2. Berkowitz v. Winston, 128 Ohio St. 611, 193 NE. 343 (1934).
3. 109 Ohio App. 106, 163 N.E.2d 801 (1958).
4. 162 N.B.2d 926 (Ohio Munic. Ct. 1959).
5. Id. at 927.
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irreconcilable conflict with certain provisions of the Revised Code which
deal with the removal of employees protected by civil service and which
provide that members of police and fire departments of cities may have a
further appeal on questions of law and fact to the common pleas court.2
Within the past five years municipal corporations have won several
significant victories in the home rule field: In State ex rel. Lynch v.
Cleveland,3 a 1956 case, and State ex re. Canada v. Phillips,4 a 1958 case,
the supreme court upheld the constitutional right of a charter city to pro-
vide for appointment to municipal positions in a manner at variance with
the methods laid down by state statutes.
On the other hand, in 1941, the supreme court had held in In re For-
tune5 that an ordinance of the City of Cleveland Heights which attempted
to make the decision of that city's civil service commission final in dis-
ciplinary matters must yield to the state statute which permitted further
appeal to the common pleas court.
In Cupps, therefore, the supreme court was forced to choose between
the approach taken in Lynch and Canada and that taken in Fortune. The
court chose to follow the latter, a case more closely related to the one
before it. In reaching its conclusion the court reiterated the long settled
principle that municipal corporations have no power, by virtue of the
home-rule amendment, to establish courts or to regulate the administra-
tion of justice.' Furthermore, Section 4 of Article IV of the Ohio Con-
stitution provides that the jurisdiction of the court of common pleas "shall
be fixed by law." While charter provisions and even municipal ordi-
nances are "law" for many purposes, it would hardly do to have the juris-
diction of the basic trial court vary from city to city, and, in addition, a
city council should not have the right to cut off an aggrieved party's re-
course to the courts. Accordingly, the court held that the statute con-
trolled. An identical result had been reached in an entirely different case
by the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court a few weeks prior to the
supreme court's decision.!
Ordinance Versus Statute
With all due respect to a unanimous bench, the writer of this article
is compelled to enter a squeaky but vigorous dissent from the decision
1. 170 Ohio St. 144, 163 N.E.2d 384 (1959).
2. OHIo REv. CODE § 143.27.
3. 164 Ohio St. 437, 132 N.E.2d 118 (1956). See Blume, Municipal Home Rule in Ohio:
The New Look, 11 WEST. RES. L. REV. 538, 547 (1960); Sonenfield, Municipal Corpora-
tions, Survey of Ohio Law - 1959, 11 WEST. RES. L. Rv. 405 (1960); Sonentield, Munici-
pal Corporations, Survey of Ohio Law - 1958, 10 WEST. RES. I- REv. 425, 430 (1959).
4. 168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958).
5. 138 Ohio St. 385, 35 N.E.2d 442 (1941).
6. Ibid. State ex rel. Cherrington v. Hutsinpiller, 112 Ohio St. 468, 147 N.E. 647 (1925).
7. Klucar v. Hull, 165 N.E.2d 246 (Ohio C.P. 1959).
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reached by the supreme court in the other case decided by it in this area
of municipal home rule during the period which this survey covers. No
effort to oust a competent court of its constitutional-statutory jurisdiction
was involved, so that the question became one of "why a charter?"
The facts in State ex rel. Pettit v. Wagner8 were simple. The City of
North College Hill is a non-charter municipality. By ordinance of its
council, duly enacted, it provided that the mayor appoint to the position
of chief of police one of the three candidates certified to him by the muni-
cipal civil service commission as having had the highest grades upon open
competitive examination; the ordinance did not require that that ap-
pointee be a member of the city's police department. In both respects,
therefore, the ordinance differed irreconcilably from the applicable pro-
vision of the state statute,9 which requires not only that the appointee be
the top scorer in the examination but also that he be from the ranks.
The supreme court held that the ordinance was in conflict with the
state statute and that the statute must be followed.
The first step must be an examination of the differences between the
relevant facts in Lynch and Canada, on the one hand, and this latest case,
Pettit, on the other.
In Lynch the position of Chief of Police in the City of Cleveland was
specifically placed by an amendment to that city's charter in the unclassi-
fied civil service. The supreme court had little difficulty in sustaining
this divagation from the state statute. In Canada, there was no specific
provision in the Columbus city charter, as there was in Cleveland's, upon
which to turn the decision. But there was a provision whereby all ap-
pointments in civil service were to be made from a certification of the
three highest scoring applicants. The supreme court had little difficulty
in upholding the city in its application of this provision to police depart-
ment promotions, despite its variance from the state statute dealing specif-
ically with that department. In both instances it allowed the city to fol-
low the direct or indirect admonition of its charter. In Pettit it did not,
for the reason that the admonition came not from a charter but from an
ordinance.
Now, since the decision in Perrysburg v. Ridgeway'° in 1923, it has
been thought to be well-established law that all municipal corporations
in Ohio are entitled to all of the benefits of section 3 of article XVIII
of the state constitution; that it is not necessary to adopt a charter in
order to exercise "all powers of local self government"; and that section
8. 170 Ohio St. 297, 164 N.E.2d 574 (1960).
9. Omo REv. CODE § 143.34.
10. 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923).
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3 was in no way dependent upon section 7 of the same article, but was
self-executing."
In its opinion in the Pettit case the court admits three propositions:
(1) Perrysburg is still the law, despite the fact that it was a four-to-three
decision and that two of the four in the majority were hesitant about how
far a non-charter city could go in the face of "general law"; (2) that the
grant in section 3 of the right to exercise "all powers of local self gov-
ernment" is not limited by the grant of the right "to adopt and enforce
... such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in
conflict with general laws"; 2 and (3) Columbus and Cleveland do not
have to follow "general laws" in appointing police chiefs because their
charters are different from general laws.
The power to provide for the method of hiring and firing a police
chief is, in the opinion of the author, a power of local self government
and not a power to adopt a local police regulation."3 It is only in adopt-
ing local police regulations that any municipal corporation is, or should
be, subject to general laws. But even if it is assumed that the appoint-
ment of a police chief is within the power to adopt local police regula-
tions, then Lynch and Canada are, God save the mark, wrongly decided,
not because Cleveland and Columbus have charters, but because the
method used in those cities is contrary to general law on the subject. If
the appointment of a police chief is a power of local self government, then
Pettit is wrongly decided, not because North College Hill has no charter,
but because in the area of local self government a municipal corporation
is not bound by "general laws." To this writer it is that simple.
Other Problems in Appointment and Removal
Pursuant to the applicable statute'4 the Mayor of the Village of
Belpre preferred charges against the Chief of Police for misconduct and
inefficiency. A hearing was had before the municipal council, which
voted by the required majority to remove the accused officer. The chief
appealed to the courts and the case ultimately reached the supreme
court.
1 5
11. For just one example, see State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 580, 53 N.E.2d
501, 504 (1944); Fordham, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 18,
25 (1948). It is true that in this case Cincinnati's charter had to yield to state law, on the
basis of the doctrine of "state-wide concern," but even the majority of the court in an unfavor-
able decision admit that a charter is not necessary in order for a city to exercise whatever
powers it does have within the concept of "local self government."
12. OHIo CONST. art XVIII, § 3.
13. The author of this article invokes no less an authority than the Honorable Murray Sea-
songood. See Cincinnati and Home Rule, 9 O1Ho ST. L.J. 98, 112 (1948).
14. OHIo REV. CODE 5 733.35.
15. In reWalker, 171 Ohio St. 177, 168 N.E.2d 535 (1960).
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The key to the problem lies in the wording of section 737.15, where-
in, among other things, it is said that
[i]n case of the removal of a marshal or chief of police of a village,
an appeal may be had from the decision of the legislative authority to
the court of common pleas to determine the sufficiency of the cause of
removal .... (Emphasis added.)
The common pleas court had stated that the emphasized words re-
quired it to determine whether or not there were substantial charges and
credible evidence in support of those charges, and on that basis upheld the
action of council. The court of appeals had reversed the council and the
trial court, holding that the evidence against the accused must be "dear
and convincing." The supreme court agreed with the common pleas
court's reading of the statute and therefore reversed the court of appeals.
Its decision brings the construction of the statute dealing with the removal
of safety officers in villages in line with the construction given to the
statute relating to appeals by safety officers under civil service, prior to
the amendment of the latter statute in 1955.16
In State ex el, DeMatteo v. Allet' 7 the relator had been a village
patrolman. Five years after his appointment as such he had been "em-
ployed" as chief of police of the village. Section 737.17 of the Revised
Code provides that all appointments to village police departments shall
be for a probationary period of six months' continuous service; that none
shall be finally made until the appointee has satisfactorily served his pro-
bationary period; and that at the end thereof the mayor may, with the
concurrence of the legislative authority, remove or finally appoint the
employee. In DeMatteo's case no action was taken at the end of his first
six months as chief, and it was not until eighteen months after his being
named chief that the council finally refused to concur with the mayor in
approving him.
The supreme court refused to issue a writ of mandamus to require the
respondent mayor of the village to "restore" relator to the position of
chief of police. The apparent result of this case is the holding that each
promotion in a village police department is, in effect, a new appointment,
that it is probationary, and that non-action on the part of the appointing
and confirming authority works no estoppel in favor of the appointee.
This writer can see a possibility that a changed political complexion could
cause the ouster of a man who had served well and faithfully for many
years, but who had overlooked the necessity of prodding a favorably dis-
posed mayor and council "to dot the i' and cross the 't."'
16. OHIo Rv. CODE § 143.27, as amended, 126 Ohio Laws 91 (1955). See In re Koeliner,
160 Ohio St. 504, 117 NE.2d 169 (1954).
17. 170 Ohio St. 375, 165 N.E.2d 644 (1960).
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CONTRACTS - LOWEST AND BEST BID
Numerous statutes in Title VII of the Revised Code'" require that
public contracts be let to "the lowest and best" bidder. Sometimes it is
quite obvious who has earned that sobriquet, other times it is not so easy.
Accordingly, the courts have permitted the contracting municipal officer
a broad discretion 9 with which they are reluctant to interfere. In Heitch
v. Village of Chagrin Falls" the supreme court did interfere. Oddly
enough, there was involved in this case the rarer problem of the highest
bidder, for the village was leasing out municipally owned property, and
the statute in that case requires the lease to be made to the highest
bidder."'
The village received two bids, one for a rental of $63,000 to be paid
over a period of twenty-five years, the other providing for no sum of
money, but offering to use the land solely and exclusively for parking
purposes, to be open to the general public, the bidder to grade, pave and
sewer the premises at its own expense, provide the area with adequate
lighting, and permit the village to install parking meters at any time and
to retain all the revenue therefrom. It should be pointed out that this
latter bidder appears to have been a group developing a shopping center
in immediate or close proximity to the land which was the subject of the
proposed lease.
The supreme court seems tacitly to have conceded that there are other
and better things in this world than mere money. But, it said, in effect,
that if the parking lot arrangement was worth more than $63,000, it had
to be convinced of that fact and neither the village nor the shopping cen-
ter group had convinced the court. In the absence of a showing that the
no-money-but-lots-of-service" bidder's consideration "exceeded or even
approached the $63,000 named in the other bid," the value of the im-
provement-and-service bid remained in "the realm of mere speculation."
Accordingly, acceptance of the no-money bid was enjoined.
Quaere: Could the council now adopt the shopping center's offer as
its specifications upon which bids for a lease were to be offered and re-
advertise on such a basis?
PENALTIES UNDER ORDINANCES
Coming back again to home rule, can we agree that it is settled that
a municipal criminal ordinance is not in conflict with general laws merely
because it provides for a greater penalty than that indicated by the cor-
18. For example: OHIO REV. CODE §§ 731.14, 735.05.
19. See ELLIS, OHIO MUNICIPAL CODE, Text § 8.28 (10th ed. 1955) and cases cited therein.
20. 171 Ohio St. 172, 168 N.E.2d 410 (1960)
21. OHIO REV. CODE § 721.03.
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responding state statute?2 As a general proposition, this can be said to
be true, although a new element was injected into the problem in 1958
by the decision in City of Cleveland v. Betts,"
An analogous situation was the center of controversy in City of Co-
lumbus v. Kraner24 By ordinance the City of Columbus enacted a muni-
cipal income tax. The ordinance contains a three-year statute of limita-
tions on prosecutions for violation of the obligations under the ordinance.
Section 1905.33 of the Revised Code, however, provides that:
Actions for the recovery of fines, penalties, or forfeitures, or prosecu-
tions for the commission of any offense made punishable by any ordi-
nance of any municipal corporation, shall be commenced within one year
after the violation of the ordinance, or commission of the offense. (Em-
phasis added.)
One Kraner was charged with a violation of the ordinance in Colum-
bus Municipal Court. He moved to dismiss for the reason that the city
had not commenced prosecution within the one year provided by the state
statute. The Court of Appeals for Franklin County ruled that his motion
should have been granted.
The court distinguished the statute of limitations situation from the
penalty situation on the ground that, insofar as the penalties provided by
statute were concerned, "there were no words of limitation upon the au-
thority of the municipalities, but here in section 1905.33 the legislature
must have intended that this be a limitation upon the authority of the
city, as it is directed to 'any municipal corporation' and 'forbids that which
the ordinance permits'."25
This writer submits that section 715.67 of the Revised Code (as set
forth below2") is as much an attempted restriction upon the authority of
municipalities as is section 1905.33; yet the supreme court held that
715.67 did not prevent the City of Youngstown from imposing a more
severe penalty than the maximum permitted by that section.2
If section 715.67 "is not a law defining offenses and prescribing pun-
22. Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923); Fordham, Home
Rule Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 Oio ST. LJ. 18, 47, 68 (1948); Ellis, op. cit. supra,
note 19, Text, pp. 25, 26 and 27, citing City of Youngstown v. Evans, 121 Ohio St. 342, 168
N.E. 844 (1929).
23. 168 Ohio St. 386, 154 N.E.2d 917 (1958). See Greene, Criminal Law and Procedure,
Survey of Ohio Law - 1959, 11 WEsT. REs. L REV. 366, 368 (1960); Sonenfield, Muanici-
pal Corporations, Survey of Ohio Law - 1959, 11 WnsT. REs. L REv. 405, 510 (1960).
See also discussion in Constitutional Law section, p. 471 supra.
24. 169 NY..2d 44 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
25. Id. at 46.
26. The section provides: "Any municipal corporation may make the violation of any of its
ordinances a misdemeanor, and provide for the punishment thereof by fine or imprisonment,
or both. The fine, imposed under authority of this section, shall not exceed five hundred dol-
lars and imprisonment shall not exceed six months."
27. City of Youngstown v. Evans, 121 Ohio St. 342, 168 N.E. 844 (1929).
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ishment therefor,"2 then neither is section 1905.33. For this reason the
court of appeals' decision in City of Columbus appears to go against the
position taken by the supreme court.
TORT LIABILITY - PROPRIETARY CAPACITY
In its 1958 decision in Broughton v. City of Cleveland,9 the supreme
court determined that the collection of rubbish and garbage by a munici-
pal corporation was a governmental function and denied recovery to an
unhappy lady who was struck by a flying object being tossed by "Aber-
crombie" to "Fitch" while they were performing this function for Cleve-
land. It is of interest that after that decision the Court of Appeals for
Summit County ruled in Lasko v. City of Akron" that when a city en-
gages in the disposal of garbage and rubbish, not only for its own inhabit-
ants, but at the same time and in the same place engages for a fee in the
business of disposing of garbage and rubbish for other municipalities and
private parties, it is acting in a proprietary capacity and is subject to com-
mon-law liability for conduct which causes injury to another. This rul-
ing, though contrary to Broughton, appears to be clearly justified because
of the distinctive facts upon which it was based.
MANDAMUS TO COMPEL SUBMISSION
OF CHARTER TO VOTERS
The Ohio Constitution gives the voters of any municipal corporation
the right to frame and adopt a charter."' Occasionally such a document
is the cause of violent political strife. Such was the case history which
preceded and led up to State ex rel. Graham v. Pestrak.32 A charter com-
mission had been elected in Warren, had framed a charter document for
submission to the voters and had set the date for the special election on it.
The mayor and at least a majority of the city council either neglected or
refused to take the necessary steps to place the question on the ballot at
the time fixed by the charter commission. Less than two months before
the date established by the commission for the election, a writ of manda-
mus was sought by a member of the commission to compel the mayor and
council to take the necessary steps to hold the election. For various rea-
sons argument upon and submission of the mandamus action to the su-
preme court could not be had until after the date set for the special elec-
tion, and thus the argument was not held until after the one year limit
fixed by the Constitution for the holding of such an election.
28. Id. at syllabus 2.
29. 167 Ohio St. 29, 146 N.E.2d 301 (1958). See Sonenfield, Municipal Corporations,
Survey of Ohio Law - 1958, 10 WEST. RES. L. REv. 425 (1959).
30. 166 N.E.2d 771 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958), motion to certify denied, Dec. 17, 1958.
31. Art. XVIII, §§ 7-9.
32. 171 Ohio St. 221, 168 N.B.2d 545 (1960).
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The supreme court refused to issue the writ, indicating in a brief
opinion that it was doing so because the facts had not been "presented in
an adequate manner" to show that "illegal and obstructive tactics" were
being employed by the legislative authority in "deliberately and wrong-
fully attempting to thwart the constitution and the electorate." 3
Judge Taft vigorously dissented, and, to this writer, he seems to have
had the better of the argument.34 It is to be hoped that the case will not
become a precedent for heel-dragging and obstructionism.
ZONING PROBLEMS
Each year's collection of opinions contains a spate of those in which
a court is called upon to rule whether a municipal council has acted
reasonably or arbitrarily in zoning or refusing to zone Blackacre for a
gas station, factory or land fill. Almost every one of such cases turns
on its own unique fact situation, and seldom is there enunciated any
startlingly new principle of zoning law or any unusual application of an
existing precept. During the period covered by this survey, the follow-
ing noteworthy zoning decisions were published, dealing with problems
other than the reasonableness of the zoning of specific parcels of land.
Determination of Applicant's Rights
The case of Gibson v. City of Oberlin35 is worthy of note in this
survey, not because it establishes any new principle, but rather because
it reaffirms an old one and distinguishes a 1954 case36 in which the
supreme court had cast a modicum of doubt upon decided authority.
The general rule is that the applicant's rights to use his property are
fixed by the provisions of the zoning ordinance as of the time he per-
fects an application which is in conformity to the ordinance as it stands,
and not by the ordinance as it is subsequently changed?' The typical
situation in which the rule comes into play is this: The owner of Black-
acre presents his plans and specifications for the use or building which he
33. Id. at 223, 168 N.E.2d at 546.
34. Ibid. The dissent placed emphasis on the mandatory language of art. XVIII, § 8 of the
constitution which requires the legislative authority of the city to provide for submission of
the charter issue to the electors. The dissent also took the view that the one year period speci-
fied by the constitution for the holding of the election was intended primarily to insure'that
it was held promptly and was not meant to limit the power to hold the election.
35. 171 Ohio St. 1, 167 N.E.2d 651 (1960). See also discussion in Constitutional Law
section, p. 469 supra.
36. Smith v. Juillerat, 161 Ohio St. 424, 119 N.E.2d 611 (1954).
37. State ex rel. Fairmount Center Co. v. Arnold, 138 Ohio St. 259, 34 N.E.2d 777 (1941);
State ex rel. City Ice & Fuel Co. v. Kreuzweiser, 120 Ohio St. 352, 354, 166 N.E. 228, 229
(1929).
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desires to make or build upon his land. They conform to the zoning
requirements, but not to the wishes or hopes of other property owners in
the neighborhood. Within the usual ten-day waiting period for the
issuance of a permit the neighbors obtain the ear of a friendly council-
man, and at the next council meeting the air is filled with pleas, de-
mands and threats. On some pretext or other the issuance of the permit
is withheld and a zoning amendment is enacted which makes illegal that
which was legal when the application was first made, thereby leaving
the applicant with a lot of useless plans and specifications. There are
variations on this theme, but all are dearly recognizable.
Since, as was just stated, the general rule holds that the property
owner's rights are fixed by the terms of the zoning or building code as
of the time of proper application, and not as of the time the permit is
finally issued,8 the amendment to the zoning code should not be per-
mitted to operate against the owner of Blackacre.
In 1954, however, the supreme court cast some doubt on this rule by
its decision in Smith v. Juillerat3 In that case the applicant held a
license which permitted it to engage in strip mining upon certain lands.
A zoning resolution pending at the time such license was issued, and
enacted before the strip mining had been commenced, made such a use of
the lands illegal. Although the applicant had spent money on prelimi-
nary work pertaining to the contemplated strip mining operation, it "had
not in fact perfected a non-conforming use and thus... it had no vested
right prior to the effective date of the ordinance rendering strip mining
illegal."4  For this reason, the newly enacted ordinance was held to
control.
In the present case the application of the property owner having
been refused, he appealed to the Oberlin Board of Zoning Appeals and
then to the Oberlin City Council. While these appeals were being taken
the council was busy amending the ordinances to make illegal what had
clearly been legal at the time that Gibson had first applied. The supreme
court decided in favor of Gibson, reiterating the general rule and dis-
tinguishing Juillerat on the ground that the applicant there had not
gained any vested right because it had not yet begun its mining operations
upon the subject lands.
It is diffcult to see how the expenditure in preparation to carry on
strip mining is different from the expenditure to prepare plans and
specifications for a building, but, in all likelihood, Juillerat will remain
confined to its facts.
38. ibid.
39. 161 Ohio St. 424, 119 N.E.2d 611 (1954).
40. Gibson v. City of Oberlin, 171 Ohio St. 1, 3, 167 N.E.2d 651, 652 (1960).
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Amendment of Zoning Ordinances is a Legislative Function
A novel proposition was advanced and disposed of in Hilltop Realty,
Incorporated v. City of South Euclid.4 Plaintiffs owned a parcel of real
estate in the defendant city. At the request of plaintiffs the city council
amended the zoning ordinance to place plaintiffs' land in a less restricted
use category. The neighbors erupted with a referendum petition in
proper form. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the holding of a referendum
election thereon, arguing that while the adoption of a comprehensive
zoning ordinance is a legislative act, subject to referendum procedures,
the amendment thereof is an administrative matter and as such is not
subject to referendum procedures. They relied mostly upon a Nebraska
case in support of their contention.
The Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County was unanimously un-
impressed with the logic of the Nebraska case or of plaintiffs' argument.
It pointed out that the legislative authority of the city was vested in a
council and that under section 713.07 of the Ohio Revised Code the legis-
lative authority of a municipal corporation is empowered to adopt and
amend zoning ordinances. As such the amending ordinance was subject
to referendum.
Use of Zoning to Limit Number of Establishments
The question is occasionally asked whether a municipality may legally
limit, by zoning, the number of establishments of a particular kind within
a given area. It is intimated in State ex rel. Husted v. Woodmansee43
that it may not do so with respect to gasoline stations. It should be
pointed out that there are other factors upon which the decision may have
turned, so that it is not fair to say that the case stands unequivocally for
this principle.
Control of Liquor Traffic
Similarly, there is an intimation in City of Lyndhurst v. Compola "
that zoning may not be used to outlaw the location of establishments
dispensing alcoholic beverages. Again, there are other factors in this
particular case which make it impossible to say with finality that the
court based its decision solely on this point.
41. 164 N..2d 180 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
42. Kelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d 713 (1956).
43. 169 N.E.2d 655 (Ohio Cr. App. 1960). See also discussion in Constitutional Law
section, p. 469 supra.
44. 169 N.E.2d 558 (Ohio Cr. App. 1960).
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Abatement of Nonconforming Uses
Insofar as the Supreme Court of Ohio has ever spoken on whether a
prior nonconforming zoning use may be compulsorily abated or termi-
nated, it did so in City of Akron v. Chapman."5 In that case the court
denied the right of the city to compel such termination, although it is the
opinion of this writer that the case does not stand for a rule that a city
may never accomplish that result; rather, he prefers to explain the de-
cision on the basis of the weakness and uncertainty of the ordinance there
in question.
The principal case has a direct sequel in City of Akron v. Klein,"6 in
which the same junk yard premises were involved, although the operator
had not directly succeeded by purchase from the previous owner whose
rights had been upheld in Chapman.
The city this time attacked the operation on the ground of nuisance
and relied upon the right given municipal corporations by statute to
[a] bate any nuisance and prosecute in any court of competetit jurisdiction,
any person who creates, continues, contributes to or suffers such nuisance
to exist. . ..
Ruling for the first time on this statute the supreme court approved
the court of appeals determination that "the statute . . . must be in-
terpreted as though the word 'public' appeared before the word
'nuisance.' "48 Refusing to disturb what it assumed to have been the
finding of the court of appeals, the supreme court held that it had not
been shown that Klein was operating a public nuisance. Certainly the
inference may be taken that if the court of appeals had found such a
public nuisance, and the record had offered a reasonable basis for such a
finding, then the operation would have at least pro tanto been enjoined.
Or to put it as a general rule, no prescriptive or prior nonconforming
right to operate a public nuisance may be acquired. This is probably
only by inference a principle of zoning law; its broader base is the over-
all police power of the state and its political subdivisions.49
There is another aspect of the Klein case which bears noting here.
The ordinance in question forbade the operation of junk yards between
45. 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697 (1953). See also, Note, 6 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 182
(1955); Sonenfield, Municipal Corporations, Survey of Ohio Law - 1954, 6 WEsr. REs. L.
REV. 271, 273 (1955).
46. 171 Ohio St. 207, 168 N.E.2d 564 (1960).
47. OHIO REv. CODE § 715A4(A). It is submitted that under the constitutional grant of
all powers of local self-government the attempt by the legislature to grant or limit this power
is an act of arrogant supererogation.
48. City of Akron v. Klein, 171 Ohio St. 207, 211, 168 N.E.2d 564, 567 (1960).
49. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) and other cases cited by the Ohio
Supreme Court at footnote 1 of its opinion in City of Akron v. Klein, 171 Ohio St. 207, 212,
168 N.E.2d 564, 567 (1960).
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